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On 22 January 2010, the Chinese State Statistical Bureau an- 
nounced that the 2009 Chinese economic growth rate remained at 
8.7 percent, which fulfilled the 8 percent target preset by the cen- 
tral government at the end of 2008. Many celebrated this achieve- 
ment, attributing the stimulated economy to government economic 
policy. This paper analyzes how the macroeconomic policy of the 
Chinese government contributed to economic growth even under the 
global financial crisis. The present effects of this policy and its im- 
plications on the future are also examined.
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I. How China Used Macroeconomic Policy to Respond to 
the Financial Crisis
Although China was not directly hit by financial crisis and did not 
experience any financial market difficulties as what happened in Korea 
(Park and Lee 2009)，China felt the shock through slowdown of export 
in the second half of 2008 and Chinese government shifted the policy 
measures from decreasing inflation to maintaining growth rate. First, 
monetary policy was modified, so that beginning September 2008 the 
People's Bank of China (PBC China' central bank) lowered the reserve 
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TABLE 1
ADJUSTMENT OF RESERVE RATIOS BY PEOPLE’S BANK OF 
CHINA SINCE JANUARY 2008
requirement four times (Table 1). A few days later, the central bank 
lowered the bank deposit rate by 0.72 percent, going from an annual 
deposit rate of 4.14 to 3.87 percent. Since then, the deposit rate has 
been lowered three times to reflect an annual rate of 2.25 percent. On 
27 November 2008, the central bank also reduced the annual loan in- 
terest rate imposed on financial institutions from 4.68 to 3.60 percent. 
The rediscount rate was lowered from 4.32 to 2.97 percent. On 23 
December 2008, the loan and rediscount rates were again lowered to 
3.33 and 1.80 percent, respectively. The expansionary monetary policy 
quickly affected monetary supply (M2). The M2 increased to RMB 47.5 
trillion by the end of 2008, a net increase of 17.7 percent compared 
with the end-2007 monetary supply. In August 2008, the M2 increase 
rate was only 15.9 percent, an atypical rate compared with the usual 
17-18 percent.
The effect of the expansionary monetary policy became more evident 
in 2009. Bank lending and monetary supply accelerated every month. 
By the end of the year, M2 reached RMB 60.62 trillion, reflecting an 
increase of 27.68 percent or 9.86 percentage points higher compared 
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FIGURE 1
ANNUAL M2, CREDIT, AND CPI GROWTH RATE IN CHINA 
SINCE THE REFORM AND OPENING
with that of 2008, a rare occurrence in China’s history. Bank credit 
also increased to a historically high level as all loans issued by finan- 
cial institutions increased by 32.99 percent, amounting to a stock of 
RMB 42.56 trillion. The net loan increase was RMB 10.52 trillion. The 
additional net loan increase in 2009 compared with that of 2008 was 
RMB 5.54 trillion. Such a huge increase in loans and monetary supply 
rarely happens in the history of the country, with comparable expan- 
sion witnessed in 1984-86 and 1993-94, all being characterized by very 
high inflation (Figure 1). 
Aside from monetary expansion, a large-scale fiscal expansionary plan 
was launched by the Chinese central government, from which a stimu- 
lus package of RMB 4 trillion was drawn. In the package, although only 
RMB 1.18 trillion was newly mobilized and remaining RMB 2.82 trillion 
was prepared, the plan quickly encouraged local governments’ initiative 
of more than RMB 10 trillion similar stimulating spending. Of the RMB 
4 trillion package, around 60 percent was allocated in 2009, and the 
remaining 40 percent would be been spent in 2010. Looking at the 
detailed allotment, more than 80 percent was allocated for infrastruc- 
ture and 20 percent for technology enhancement, education, medical 
care, and so on (Table 2). The effect and contribution of infrastructure 
investment on GDP growth is immediate, hence the huge allocation. 
This expansionary plan quickly mobilized local governments to allocate 
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Area for fiscal spending 
Amount allocated 
(billion RMB)
Ratio out of the 
total RMB 4 
trillion budget (%)
Housing allowance and improvement 
for poverty-stricken families 
400 10.00
Rural infrastructure improvement 370  9.25
Railway, highway, airport, irrigation, 
power, and other infrastructure 
constructions 
1,500 37.50
Medical care, education, cultural, etc. 150  3.75
Energy conservation, emission 
reduction, and eco-engineering 
210  5.25
Technology innovation and structural 
adjustment 
370  9.25
Reconstruction for disaster areas 1,000 25.00
Source: China National Development and Reform Commission: http://www. 
sdpc.gov.cn/.
TABLE 2
COMPONENTS OF THE RMB 4 TRILLION CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET
more than RMB 10 trillion in similar spending.
II. Why the Chinese Stimulus Is More Effective
Both monetary and fiscal expansionary policies effectively raised the 
GDP growth rate. From the second quarter of 2009, the GDP growth 
rate in China began growing steadily (Figure 2). For the rest of the 
world, economic recovery could have taken on a U direction, but for 
China, a true V type recovery was observed.  
Major countries have also launched similarly huge economic stimu- 
lus packages to cope with the financial crisis and the resulting eco- 
nomic downturn. However, most of their strategies were not as effective 
as those of China. After Bear Stearns collapsed, the U.S. Congress 
passed a bill allocating $300 billion to help homeowners with refinan- 
cing to save on mortgage loans. Congress launched another $700 
billion to save the market after Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch 
went bankrupt. Later, the U.S. Federal Reserve provided an additional 
$800 billion credit, of which $600 billion was allocated for purchasing 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and $200 billion was provided to 
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*GDP Quarterly growth rate is the quarter comparison with the same quarter of 
last year. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
FIGURE 2
QUARTERLY CHINESE GDP GROWTH RATE*
consumers and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). After 
Barack Obama won the presidency, he launched another $787 billion 
to stimulate the U.S. economy. The Federal Reserve also lowered the 
federal fund rate to 0-0.25 percent, which was a new historical low, to 
reduce credit costs. The Federal Reserve even purchased government 
bonds directly to inject funding into the monetary base. The U.K. gov- 
ernment launched a ￡400 billion financial rescue package after the 
Royal Bank of Scotland experienced trouble. Germany also launched a 
€500 billion rescue plan and a €50 fiscal stimulus package for gov- 
ernment investments. The European Central Bank lowered its interest 
rate to 1 percent, while the Bank of England lowered its rate to 0.5 
percent. Meanwhile, the Japanese government launched three stimulus 
packages, with government spending rising to unprecedented levels. 
The Japanese stimulus plan reached a total of JPY 62.8 trillion. Nearly 
every developed country launched a record high stimulus package to 
save the economy.  
Based on a quarter by quarter comparison, most countries reflected 
a recovered GDP growth rate in the third quarter of 2009. However, 
compared with the same season last year, the figures were not all posi- 
tive (Figures 3 and 4). The impact of macroeconomic policy was not as 
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FIGURE 3
THE U.S., EU, AND JAPAN QUARTERLY GDP GROWTH RATE 
(COMPARED WITH THE PREVIOUS QUARTER)
* The U.S. figure is the quarterly adjusted annual growth rate, while the EU 
and Japan figures are the rates compared with the same period last year.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostats, and Japanese State 
Statistics Bureau.
FIGURE 4
THE U.S., EU, AND JAPAN QUARTERLY GDP GROWTH RATE*
impressive compared with the growth of the Chinese economy. Why is 
the effect of macroeconomic policy more substantial in China than in 
other countries? Four main factors have been found to be contributory  
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FIGURE 5
DETAILED BUDGET FOR THE U.S. STIMULUS PACKAGE
to this incidence: the size of fiscal and monetary expansion, growth- 
oriented economic atmosphere, monetary expansion effectiveness, and 
economic structure and low development stage.
The RMB 4 trillion central government budget is equivalent to around 
U.S.$ 5,800, nearly equal to the fiscal spending of the Obama admini- 
stration. However, out of the China budget, infrastructure investment 
accounted for 80 percent, while in the U.S. fiscal spending, less than 
20 percent was allocated for infrastructure development (Figure 5). 
World Bank Chief Economist Justin Yifu Lin also mentioned this point 
when he spoke to Wall Street Journal.1 Infrastructure investment could 
have an immediate stimulation impact on GDP growth, while invest- 
ments in education and R&D could bring forth benefits in the long 
run.
The growth-oriented atmosphere in China also exerted a considerable 
influence on GDP growth. In China, incentives for local governments to 
stimulate economic growth are never lacking. Local governments are 
accorded merit based largely on their GDP growth rate; hence, pushing 
the GDP is deeply emphasized in their strategies. When the central 
government directed policy orientation towards economic growth, local 
1 Bob Davis: Q & A: “World Bank’s Lin on Why China Stimulus Is More Ef- 
fective.” The Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2009.
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
FIGURE 6
ANNUAL INVESTMENT, CREDIT, AND INFLATION GROWTH RATES IN CHINA
governments at each level promptly mobilized their resources to expand 
investments in their regions. Officials queued at the National Develop- 
ment and Reform Commission as certain investment projects required 
commission approval. All these resulted in a much quicker and more 
sizeable increase in local government fixed asset investments compared 
with central government investments. In 2009, the total fixed asset 
investment was RMB 22.48 trillion, which grew by 30.5 percent com- 
pared with that in 2008. However, the fixed asset investment projects 
of the central government grew by only 18.4 percent at RMB 1.97 tril- 
lion during the first 11 months of 2009. Local government spending in 
the same period grew by 32 percent, amounting to RMB 17.44 trillion. 
Nearly 78 percent of the fixed asset investments were local government 
projects. A similar investment volume and growth rate was observed at 
a smaller scale in 1985 and 1992-94, followed by a high inflation rate 
in the next two years (Figure 6).      
The effectiveness of monetary policy in expanding monetary supply 
also played an important role. Many scholars discussed ineffectiveness 
before the financial crisis hit China (Yao 2009), and most of them 
mentioned the slow economic response to contracting policy (Liao et al. 
2007; Zhu 2009). When the Chinese central bank lowered the reserve 
requirement and interest rate, the market reacted swiftly. Banks began 
to issue new loans, which was a move that changed enterprise and  
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FIGURE 7
ANNUAL FIXED ASSET INVESTMENT IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF CHINA
household expectations, encouraging borrowing for investments and 
real estate purchase. The real estate industry developed rapidly, and 
the automobile industry experienced a sudden boost with government 
taxation providing preferential treatment towards energy saving cars. 
The growth rate of M1 and M2 in China increased to approximately 30 
percent in 2009. Deflation expectation reversed quickly to inflation. If 
we look at the U.S. in comparison, although the U.S. Federal Reserve 
relaxed monetary policy, the banks did not issue more loans. Companies 
and households were reluctant to expand new credit. This ended up 
increasing M1 more quickly than M2. By 1 December 2009, the U.S. 
monetary stock M1 increased by 13 percent compared with the same 
day last year, while M2 increased by only 5.7 percent in the same 
period. This shows that the deleveraging process has not yet been 
completed in the U.S. Thus far, companies and households show little 
confidence in future income and economic growth, making for a con- 
servative investment behavior and consumption. Thus, to date, the U.S. 
economic recovery is largely based on government fiscal stimulation. 
Finally, China is still in the low development stage, and its per 
capita GDP is only U.S.$ 3,300. China is not completely industrialized, 
an environment that usually brings high economic growth. Many new 
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industrialized economies (NIEs) experienced a similar high growth phase 
in the past. However, China is such a big country with a huge popula- 
tion, which prolongs its industrialization period. Although some of its 
costal urban areas are nearing industrialization, most of China’s central 
and western regions are still gradually catching up with industriali- 
zation and urbanization. There is a big room for improvement in infras- 
tructure development, and the Chinese government could use fiscal ex- 
penditure to increase investments to maintain its growth rate. Fixed 
asset investment in the central and western provinces has sped up, 
while east coastal provinces reflect a slowdown since 2003 (Figure 7).
In 2009, when the central government launched a fiscal stimulus, 
the western region was accorded the most investment projects, as the 
infrastructure in the west was comparatively poor. Thus, ladder-like 
development and the gap between regions enabled China to maintain 
high growth for a longer period of time. 
III. The Cost of Large-Scale Fiscal and Monetary 
Stimulation 
In most developed countries, the biggest cost of large-scale stimulation 
lies in the growing budget deficit and government debt. The huge fiscal 
spending of the U.S. has already led to a sizeable federal government 
budget deficit, which rose to a GDP ratio of 9.9 percent in 2009 from 
3.2 percent in 2008. It is expected that the ratio will remain at a high 
level of 10.6 percent in 2010.2 The U.S. federal government’s debts 
rose to $12.1 trillion and will rise to $14 trillion in 2010. This will 
cause increasing distrust from the international community on whether 
the U.S. is capable of maintaining the stability of the U.S. dollar ex- 
change rate. If this skepticism spreads, the international financial 
market would become unstable. Another cost is the potential pressure 
of inflation, although in most countries this is not yet a problem. 
Expectations on inflation are certainly growing, a situation that may 
escalate if not properly dealt with. EU member countries and Japan all 
face deteriorating fiscal deficits and heavy debts. Countries in the Euro 
Zone are in a more difficult situation owing to the obligations of main- 
taining favorable budget deficit levels and government debts under the 
Stability and Growth Pact. These countries are more inclined to exit 
2 See Whitehouse Office of Management and Budget: President’s Budget FY 
2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview/.
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the expansionary policy as soon as it is possible for them to do so. 
This is the background of discussion on the exit of the stimulus among 
the international society.
The Chinese case is different, as its growth rate is high, and the 
ability of the government to control economic activities is strong. How- 
ever, China also paid a huge price in implementing fiscal stimulus and 
monetary policies.  
The most significant consequence is the slowdown of structural ad- 
justment. To maintain the economic growth rate, which is believed to 
be imperative for maintaining employment security, the central govern- 
ment was compelled to relax its control over industrial structure re- 
quirements in their supervision of investment projects. Since November 
2009, demand for exports from developed countries dropped, causing 
China’s export growth rate to decline to a negative figure. The contri- 
bution of exports to GDP also plunged to a negative rate. Exporting 
has been the second most important pillar of China’s economic de- 
velopment since 2001 after China joined the WTO. Labor-incentive 
export is also the most important sector for creating jobs. The sharp 
decline in exports made unemployment an urgent issue for the eco- 
nomic policy. Structural upgrading and adjustment is a must to build 
a solid foundation for sustainable growth. Conversely, the country 
must create enough jobs for the laid-off workers of the export sector. 
The Chinese government had to choose a policy that could first ad- 
dress the most urgent issue unemployment, which provide opportunities 
for growth to some low-level industries such as iron and steel, glass, 
cement, and other construction materials. Such a measure could al- 
leviate the effects of investments that could worsen structural imbal- 
ance or those that create potentially more serious excess production. 
The overall excess production in the manufacturing sector worsened, 
and the efficiency of utilizing resources declined. Economic growth 
became more dependent on fixed asset investment.
Economists may argue that China did not really experience a reces- 
sion, as the country maintained a growth rate of over 6 percent. How- 
ever, it is important for China to grow by more than 8 percent, pri- 
marily to create more jobs. Our past experiences dictate that a 1 per- 
cent growth could create roughly one million new jobs. Every year up 
to the present, there will be 8-9 million new graduates who will join 
the urban work force; hence, an economic growth of under 8 percent  
could pose grave unemployment problems. Even if China maintains a 
growth rate above 8 percent, the immigration population and laid-off 
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FIGURE 8
REAL ESTATE PRICE INDEX OF CHINA
workers from state-owned enterprises have already created unemployment 
issues. The growth-oriented economic policy has deeply rooted reasons. 
When unemployment becomes an urgent problem, structural adjustment 
targets would follow, although in theory the two can complement each 
other to achieve stability in the economy.
The second repercussion is the asset bubble created by the monetary 
supply expansion. Low cost credit and easy access to credit increased 
inflation expectation and investment demand for real estate. Similarly, 
other financial assets grew fast, resulting in a speedy rise in stock 
market and real estate prices. In 2009, the overall average real estate 
price in China increased by 9.1 percent, and residential housing prices 
grew by 11 percent (Figure 8). In metropolitan cities such as Shanghai, 
residential housing prices increased by 42.4 percent (Figure 9). Com- 
pared with the prices at the end of the first quarter of 2009, the housing 
price growth rate in Shanghai in the last three quarters jumped to 44.3 
percent. This was another record high since the real estate market 
opened in the early 1990s. 
Stock market prices began increasing in March 2009. In only four 
months, from March to August 2009, the Shanghai Stock Composite Index 
increased by 75 percent (Figure 10). Amidst fears of potential inflation and 
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Source: China Real Estate Index System (CREIS): Monthly Report for Shanghai 
Index.
FIGURE 9
REAL ESTATE PRICE INDEX OF SHANGHAI
Source: http://Finance.yahoo.com.
FIGURE 10
SHANGHAI STOCK MARKET PRICE INDEX 
(FROM JANUARY 2008 TO JANUARY 2010)
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policy that may reverse to inflation fighting measures, the market has 
continued to fluctuate since August 2009 and will fluctuate further 
when fiscal stimulus exit strategies begin. 
The asset bubble enticed more people to speculate. Many quit their 
original business activities to invest in real estate or the stock market 
with the expectation that the bubble would grow bigger before they 
could withdraw from the market. This is the most negative impact of 
the asset bubble even the bubble may not burst, as it exceedingly at- 
tracted resources into the financial sector while reducing real economy 
size. As people begin to accept that there is a bubble and that it may 
burst in the future, they may start to reassess the situation, which will 
in turn cause money to flow out of the asset market. Eventually, a 
burst will take place and lead to a financial crisis and economic re- 
cession similar to that which is currently happening in the U.S. Even if 
the bubble does not burst for a while, the inflation impact on com- 
modity prices will accelerate after asset prices jump to a higher level. 
Thus, in the beginning of 2010, the Chinese government had to take 
measures to counter the heating up of the real estate market, to which 
the market reacted sensitively. Real estate prices stopped rising, and 
the stock market dropped by almost 10 percent during the first month 
of 2010.
The asset bubble also has another negative impact that is attracting 
foreign speculative short-term capital inflow. According to Zhang Ming’s 
assessment (Zhang 2010), in the second quarter of 2009 when the 
asset price started to rise, short-term capital stopped flowing out and 
was directed back into China. In the first quarter there was a U.S.$ 
45.7 billion capital outflow. In the second quarter, short term capital 
flew into China was U.S.$ 87.9 billion. In the third and fourth quarters 
the inflow figure maintained at U.S.$ 59.6 and U.S.$ 48.9 billion re- 
spectively. Total short-term capital inflow in 2009 was U.S.$ 150 
billion. Only in December 2009, the short term capital inflow declined 
to U.S.$ 5.5 billion. Speculative short-term capital inflow pushes asset 
prices higher. Inflow will then be withdrawn in the future when risks 
begin to present themselves. Thus, this situation adds to asset market 
volatility and increases the risk of sudden asset bubble burst.
Fiscal stimulus also leads to potential inflation. Figure 1 shows that 
after the rapid M2 and credit growth, the subsequent one or two years 
were characterized by high inflation beginning in 1980. Some economists 
believed that after the late 1990s, the situation might change as the 
stock market opened a pool for excess liquidity, which could serve as 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
FIGURE 11
MONTHLY CPI FIGURE IN CHINA (2008-2009)
an inflation buffer. To a certain extent, inflation was moderated as the 
credit and M2 growth rates in 2003 rose to 20 percent, while inflation 
rate increased only mildly in 2004. Thus, the economists also believed 
that the rapid credit and M2 growth in 2009 was achieved during the 
deflation period and that there would likely be no high inflation in 
2010 if the policy started to turn around. Many economists projected 
that a controllable inflation rate of below 3 percent in 2010 would 
occur. However, the policy turn-around poses problems. The banks in 
China may not be able to reduce loans as quickly as they can respond 
to the expansionary policy and increased loans once the policy focus 
shifts to inflation control. Bank managers at each level have an in- 
centive to generate profit to gain bonuses. The only way to make a 
profit is to lend as frequently as possible considering that the gap 
between deposit and loan rates is more than 2 percent. Stephen Green, 
a Shanghai-based economist for Standard Chartered Bank, also noticed 
this issue. “While China's banking system is remarkably efficient at re- 
sponding to a crisis and reviving the economy, it just isn't what you 
need when you want to guide credit down.”3 Hence, even if the central 
government is aware that the inflation may become a problem and 
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begins to control liquidity, there will be a time lag, and inflation will 
soar quickly after the huge increase in monetary supply and bank 
lending. Figure 11 shows the possibility of a quickly rising inflation 
after November 2009.
Yet another disadvantage of the fiscal stimulation is that although 
the rapid increase in fixed asset investment produced immediate effects 
on GDP growth, in the long run this may decrease efficiency in resource 
allocation and total factor productivity (TFP). The central government 
did require local governments to ensure the investment projects were 
studied well before launching in the 2009 stimulation period. The local 
governments were even requested not to start a totally new project but 
to complete the planned projects ahead of time. However, in practice, 
these projects are not insured, and the central government has no 
capacity to examine them all. Even if all the projects were examined, 
distortion in government investment mechanisms could lead to low 
efficiency. The change in total factor productivity (TFP) upon large in- 
crease in investments can be demonstrated by the Solow residual. 
According to this model, given that Yt＝Zt F (Kt, Lt, Et, Mt), TFP is Yt/F
(Kt, Lt, Et, Mt). As Kt increases quickly without Yt increasing to a 
parallel level, then, other things being equal, the TFP will be lower 
than before. Although scholars in China argue about the long-term 
TEP trend, some believe that TEP in China has been declining since 
1992 (Zhang and Shi 2003), while others argue that it has been 
steadily rising (Xu 2007). The exact contribution of TEP to Chinese 
GDP growth is not discussed in this paper; what is being pointed out 
is that high investment growth will lead to low or decreasing TEP un- 
less GDP growth can keep pace with the investment growth rate.
A related problem is the crowding out effect on private investments. 
From the government’s point of view, there is no policy of “state-owned 
marching forward, non-state owned retreating.” The huge amount of 
government spending and loan issuance helped state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) tremendously in terms of obtaining financial resources. At the 
same time, the small and medium sized non-state owned enterprises 
(SMEs) experienced more difficulty in acquiring credit. The central gov- 
ernment tried to solve this problem and demanded that banks facilitate 
credit provision to SMEs. Banks responded by setting up SME financial 
centers in many cities to show their support for the government policy. 
3 Refer to Dinny McMahon. “China Pushes to Wean Banks Off Loans.” The 
Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2010.
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FIGURE 12
GROWTH RATE OF FIXED ASSET INVESTMENT BY STATE-OWNED 
AND CONTROLLED ENTERPRISE
Local governments at each level also established guarantee companies 
that specialized in providing guarantees to SMEs as they applied for 
loans. Until now, however, SMEs continue to experience difficulties in 
obtaining credit. The crowding out effect, wherein overall state-owned 
enterprise expansion and non-state owned enterprise contraction in 
fixed asset investments are observed, did take place after the central 
government launched the large-scale stimulus package. For example, 
state-owned or state-controlled enterprise investment grew by 16.7 per- 
cent in 2007, lower than the total urban investment growth rate of 
25.8 percent for that same year. In 2008, state-owned or state-controlled 
enterprise investment grew 22.8 percent, while overall urban investment 
growth rate increased by 26.1 percent. The SOE investment growth 
rates were all slower than the total growth rate. In 2009, the situation 
changed, with the SOE investment growth rate rising to 37.8 percent 
and overall growth rate increasing by 32.1 percent (Figure 12). The 
same phenomenon occurred in Shanghai. Overall fixed investment in 
Shanghai grew by 9.2 percent. The state-owned sector’s investment 
grew by 14.10 percent, while non-state owned enterprise investment 
increased by only 4.8 percent in the same year.
Considering such a high cost from the long-term point of view, the 
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anti-cyclic macroeconomic policy needs to be discussed further. 
Keynesian economics taught us how to use macroeconomic policy to 
deal with the lack of aggregate demand to fill the gap between demand 
and supply. Thus, whenever the economic growth rate declines to a 
negative or low level, the government ought to use expansionary mon- 
etary and fiscal policy to combat the recession. This is an accepted 
rule, although economists have already set up many preconditions and 
presumptions. However, excessive countermeasures would bring high 
costs. We experienced the negative effects of stagflation in the late 
1970s caused by a long period of excessive government policy stimula- 
tion. We have recently experienced a severe financial crisis and world 
economic recession partly caused by the excessive stimulation of mon- 
etary expansion by the U.S. Federal Reserve. Therefore, macroeconomic 
stimulus policy is effective only when resources have not been fully 
utilized and present only short-term effects. Prolonged economic growth 
by fiscal and monetary stimulation alone will sooner or later bring 
about a negative impact, and disequilibrium will occur in the form of 
either market decline and large-scale insolvency or hyperinflation. The 
same principle applies to Chinese macroeconomic policy. The negative 
impact of the stimulus is expected to occur gradually and policy will 
have to be adjusted in 2010.        
IV. The Prospects of the Chinese Economy in the Next 
Few Years
Owing to certain basic positive factors, Chinese economic growth will 
still be very high in the next five years mainly because the Chinese 
economy is still in a take-off stage, and the basic demand for industri- 
alization is huge. China has a ladder-like development structure, with 
the eastern region as the most developed, the central part developing, 
and the western area newly developing. This will cause social problems 
to a certain extent if it does not change constantly. However, it creates 
the possibility that China will adopt a flying geese development pattern. 
Industries not suitable in the east could move and shift to the central 
and western regions. By doing so, China will prolong the competi- 
tiveness of manufacturing industries and maintain a longer industry 
and product life cycle, thus having a longer high economic growth 
period. This is currently happening in China. 
The prospects of further fixed asset investment in the central and 
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western parts of China are promising. Hence, the investment growth 
rate would remain at high levels and continue offering significant con- 
tributions to overall economic growth.
Apart from the above, the impact of SOEs and further government 
reforms on economic development is also very positive. The reform and 
opening is an ongoing ambitious task for the Chinese, ensuring the 
grand macroperspective of Chinese economic development in the future. 
Factors such as human resource improvement and enhancements in 
R&D and technological programs will help China maintain rapid eco- 
nomic growth in the years to come. Although these are beyond the 
scope of the study, all these positive factors are indicated to show that 
the basic trend of Chinese economic growth in the future is optimistic 
and will be very high.
Even under optimistic conditions, in the next year or two, economic 
development will face challenges categorized into three: decline in in- 
vestments by local governments, slow private consumption growth, and 
mild export growth. In 2010-12, an 8-9 percent economic growth could 
be maintained but higher rates would be difficult to realize. 
At present, investment is the biggest contributor to GDP growth and 
this will not change in the next few years. However, the high growth of 
up to 30 percent is not sustainable and will create problems. The cen- 
tral government will still have the ability to maintain the same simula- 
ting amount, as it still possesses 40 percent of the RMB 4 trillion stim- 
ulus package. However, the local governments will not be able to main- 
tain a more than 30 percent investment growth because they are al- 
ready heavily in debt, and the monetary policy has begun to tighten. 
The central government already sent out directives to local govern- 
ments restricting them from initiating new investment projects, and 
only ongoing projects should be completed. Thus, the overall invest- 
ment growth rate will descend to a normal level of 25 percent in 2010. 
The contribution of investments to GDP will decline, and GDP will have 
to be increasingly dependent on export and consumption. 
If investments drop to 25 percent, investment contribution to GDP 
will drop from more than 70 percent in 2009 to around 50 percent in 
2010. More than one percentage point of GDP growth will be com- 
pensated for by either consumption or export. Consumption in China 
has not been increasing steadily in the past years. In 2009, the real 
growth rate of consumption of goods was 16.2 percent, only slightly 
higher than that in 2008. The nominal growth rate of consumption 
was even lower compared with that in 2008. People expect consump- 
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tion in 2010 to increase quickly as the government launched many in- 
centives to encourage consumption, especially for rural resident con- 
sumption, through subsidies directly from the government. That con- 
sumption only changes dramatically when there is a system or institu- 
tional change is observed. If no large reform measure on consumption 
is taken in 2010, a quick rise in consumption will not occur. Short 
run government subsidies will not have a profound impact on con- 
sumption.
In 2009, China’s export declined by 16 percent, and its contribution 
to GDP growth was negative. In 2010, export is expected to grow by 
about 10 percent. Although the monthly export growth in December 
2009 was 17.7 percent compared with the 2008 rate on the same 
month, there will be a low possibility for 2010 to grow at the same 
rate. The international market is not recovering as strongly as ex- 
pected, and consumption in many developed countries has not re- 
turned to its previous levels. Protectionism also presents unfavorable 
effects on China’s export. Export in 2010 will recover to normal growth 
patterns, but its contribution to the Chinese economy will be moderate, 
most likely at 1-1.5 percent. This amount will only sufficiently com- 
pensate for the decrease in investment contribution.
Owing to the increasing inflation pressure, the macroeconomic policy 
of the Chinese government in 2010 will be to exit gradually from the 
stimulus. The central bank may raise reserve rates several times and 
adjust interest rates higher to two or three times in 2010. How will 
this kind of monetary policy adjustment affect consumption? The im- 
plications of this direction require further study. According to theory, 
monetary tightening will negatively impact consumption, but high in- 
flation will have a stimulating impact on consumption, as depositors 
will have incentives to buy commodities to escape inflation loss. As dis- 
cussed above, consumption will more or less increase at a normal rate 
in real terms, that is, grow by 17-18 percent. Therefore, we can sum 
up the GDP growth rate in 2010 to be at around 9 percent. However, 
as some believe, growth rate of up to 10 percent would be very difficult 
to achieve. With this background, the focus of Chinese macroeconomic 
policy would have to shift from maintaining growth to promoting eco- 
nomic structural adjustment. Fortunately enough, policy adjustment 
has already begun, and we shall see the positive effects as asset bubbles 
have started to contract, and inflation pressure has stopped accumula- 
ting. 
The biggest problem of the Chinese economy in the long run remains 
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to be structural upgrading and adjustment. If there is no steady impro- 
vement in this regard, Chinese economic efficiency in terms of making 
full use of its resources will not enhance quickly, and China will remain 
at the low end of the international division of labor. The existing asset 
bubble will not be as serious a challenge as many outsiders expect it 
to be, and it will not burst during a financial crisis. Instead, it will be 
gradually digested during the next economic growth cycle and, in a 
worst case scenario, be absorbed by inflation. Should this happen, 
inflation will replace some of the pressure of RMB appreciation and 
cause the RMB to appreciate in real terms, while nominal exchange 
rates will appreciate slowly. 
(Received 31 January 2010; Revised 16 February 2010)
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